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Abstract 
Merchant-credit projects offer the potential of providing short-term stop-gap informal 
loans to small borrowers in countries where the formal financial system is in disarray and 
where weak property rights hinder formal finance. Credit projects involving the Agricultural 
Bank of Malaysia, contract or bridge lending in the Dominican Republic, the PNN Scheme 
in Sri Lanka, and the NAPP program in the Philippines are briefly reviewed. The advantag-
es and weaknesses of merchant-credit projects are summarized . 
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INTRODUCTION 
The coverage and volume of formal lending to rural enterprises is contracting in a 
number of countries. Nowhere is this problem more serious than in Eastern Europe 
where the dismantling of centrally planned economies is rupturing ties between 
borrowers and lenders. Few of these countries have financial systems in place that can 
soon provide loans to a large number of individual borrowers in rural areas. In addition, 
major components of rural financial markets in a number of other low-income countries 
have recently collapsed: for example, the Banco Agricola de Bolivia, FONADER in 
Cameroon, the CNCA in Togo, and the Co-operative Bank of Uganda. A number of 
other agricultural development banks and cooperatives in these countries persist only 
because of continual transfusions of funds. 
There is consternation among donors and governments over how to fill these 
voids in rural lending. Creating new financial institutions in Eastern Europe and 
rebuilding rural financial infrastructure in numerous low-income countries-under the 
best of circumstances-will not provide substantial formal financial services for several 
years; recent experience in restructuring rural financial markets in the Dominican 
Republic, in Niger, and in Indonesia suggests that it may take as long as five or ten 
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years. What to do now before these new facilities are able to provide adequate financial 
services is an open question. living with a prostrate rural financial system is not an 
option if agriculture is to provide the output required to sustain overall development and 
to enhance the standard of living of the millions of people who directly depend on it for 
their sustenance. likewise, only a healthy agriculture can provide the effective demand 
for goods and services that stimulate the vitality of non-farm rural businesses. 
While formal finance in many low-income countries is severely stressed and 
fragile, recent research is showing that various forms of informal finance persist and 
flourish in these same countries (Larson, 1988; Larson, 1991). It is likely that informal 
finance will also become a prominent part of the economic landscape in countries that 
were formerly centrally planned. In many cases, informal finance fills part of the void 
":- ... 
left by the retreating formal financial system. Despite its traditional "bad press," informal 
finance provides useful and durable services to large numbers of people who have been 
the targets of donor credit programs: owners of small non-farm firms, women, small 
farmers, and poor people in general. Informal loans made by traders, dealers and 
merchants make up an important part of these activities (Sacay and others). 
Making additional formal loans to merchants who, m turn, provide informal loans 
to some of their rural clients may be a short-run option for filling this void in some 
countries. This option complements the current emphasis on expanding and 
strengthening the private sector in low-income countries and in Eastern Europe. This 
alternative can also be expanded to service the needs of small non-farm businesses, many 
of which are operated by women. 
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MERCHANT-CREDIT PROJECfS 
In a well developed financial system formal lenders will automatically provide 
services to most merchants who are creditworthy. Many merchants, in turn, will provide 
informal credit to some of their clients out of these formal loans. In a stressed financial 
system, or in a system that is newly developed, however, creditworthy merchants may 
face severe credit rationing. New merchants who are emerging in economies that were 
formerly centrally planned may find it difficult to access formal loans because of their 
lack of experience, lack of a proven track record, and uncertainties about property 
ownership. Collateral is a particularly nettlesome hurdle for many merchants who seek 
formal loans in countries such as Nicaragua, Mozambique, and in Eastern Europe where · . 
property rights are changing. 
Credit projects in a handful of countries have augmented the access of merchants 
to formal loans, with the aim of expanding the amount of informal credit for small 
farmers, promoting production, lowering the interest rates on informal loans, and 
enhancing competition in informal markets. 
Several important assumptions are involved in these projects. First, it is assumed 
that if merchants have more ample access to formal loans they will be more liberal in 
extending loans to creditworthy customers. Second, it is presumed that it is less costly 
for merchants, who have regular transactions with clients through purchase and sale of 
goods, to determine the creditworthiness of borrowers of small amounts than it is for 
banks. Third, it is assumed that a bank usually finds it less expensive to extend loans to 
merchants, who are able to provide standard forms of collateral, than it is to directly 
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extend large numbers of small loans to clients who might deal with the merchant. 
Fourth, it is widely thought that merchants are often more successful in collecting loans 
than are banks. 
Studies of several merchant-credit projects show the procedures that are often 
found in this type of lending in rural areas. 
Input-Credit Pro~am in Malaysia1 
The Agricultural Bank of Malaysia was established in 1969 and was immediately 
asked to provide loans to support rice production. Because it was a new bank, it had 
few offices in rural areas and rural cooperatives and farmers associations were judged to 
be unsuitable credit channels. As a result, the Bank implemented in early 1970 an input 
credit scheme aimed at operators of small rice farms through "local credit centers." The 
bulk of these centers were comprised of a single private firm: rice millers, licensed paddy 
buyers, merchants, and shopkeepers who were involved in selling farm inputs or in 
buying rice. These centers effectively acted as the Bank's lending agents. 
The local credit center received formal loans from the Agricultural Bank and was 
responsible for the screening of borrowers, the extension of loans, and loan recovery. 
The low extended to farmers were short-te~ and were often in the form of coupons 
validated to purchase a given amount of inputs. Some cash loans were also made to 
farmers to cover labor expenses. Competition was fostered by allowing farmers to freely 
choose their credit center and also their input source. Loan recovery was largely the 
1 Most of the information in this section is drawn from Wells' work. 
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responsibility of the rice traders. By the end of 1974 the program was extending 
informal loans to about 17 thousand rice farmers in five regions of the country. The 
primary limit on expanding the scheme was recruiting creditworthy merchants. 
Contract Lendina in the Dnminiau RCJWblic2 
A relatively large number of agribusiness firms in the Dominican Republic 
provide informal loans to operators of small farms through contract lending, locally 
called bridge loans. In most cases the agribusinesses doing this lending fund at least part 
of their operations through formal loans, thus providing a bridge between farmers and 
banks. These firms specialize in the processing, sale, and sometimes exports of various 
· agricultural commodities such as cantaloupes, cocoa, milk, peanuts, rice, tobacco, and 
tomatoes. 
A variety of arrangements are involved in this contract lending. In some cases the 
firm provides most of the purchased inputs on credit to the farmer, may also provide 
technical assistance, with the borrowing farmers agreeing to sell their final product to the 
firm. In many cases the firm provides a guaranteed price for the product and may also 
extend cash loans ·to cover labor costs. Most loans are repaid by the agribusiness 
withholding part of the crop receipts. The lending procedures are simple for both the 
firm and the borrower, loan recovery rates are high, and borrowers are generally satisfied 
with the services provided by the agribusiness firms. In the mid-1980s more farmers 
2 Information in this section is largely drawn from a study by Ladman and others done 
in 1985. 
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received loans through these contract lending arrangements than obtained loans directly 
from the Agricultural Development Bank. 
The Praja Naya Niyamaka (PNN) Scheme in Sri I .anka3 
In 1988 two government owned banks in Sri Lanka began a program to link 
informal lenders with the formal banking system. The scheme focused on making formal 
loans to creditworthy borrowers (PNN) who might on-lend to poorer individuals. Many 
of these PNN are merchants and petty traders in rural areas who are able to provide 
satisfactory loan collateral. The PNN receives formal loans at an annual rate of interest 
of 18 percent and then were expected to on-lend these funds to poorer people at rates 
ranging up to 30 per cent per annum. The PNN bears the loan recovery risks. The 
initial target was to appoint 14,000 PNN throughout the country. 
A major objective of this scheme is to enhance competition among informal 
lenders and thereby reduce the costs of borrowing for low-income people. Because of 
the civil turmoil in the country, the expansion of the program has been slower than 
originally planned. 
The NAPP Pro~am in the Philippines4 
In the latter part of 1984 the Philippines government launched a National 
Agricultural Productivity Program (NAPP) aimed at stimulating the production of 12 
3 Most of the information in this section was extracted from Sanderatne's chapter. 
4 We draw heavily on Esguerra's work in this section. 
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agricultural commodities. A major part of this effort was the provision of government 
funds at concessionary rates to expand agricultural lending. Because of weaknesses in 
rural banks and cooperatives, part of this lending was channeled through informal 
lenders. These lenders included food and feed processors, agricultural input suppliers, 
various types of traders, and rice millers. 
These merchants were able to access government funds through commercial banks 
and were allowed wide latitude in how they extended informal loans to ultimate 
borrowers. In all cases the merchant bore the loan recovery responsibility and risk. 
Generally, the loan repayment was handled through some marketing tie. That is, the 
borrowers contracted to sell their produce to the lender, or some other cooperating 
-agency, and the payment for the loan was withheld from the receipts of the sale. 
ADVANTAGES AND WEAKNESSES 
Adyanta~es 
Merchant-credit projects offer several potential advantages. They can be 
implemented relatively quickly, they build on the strengths of both formal and informal 
financial markets, and they capitalize on information that both formal and informal 
~ 
lenders often already have regarding potential clients. This combination of formal and 
informal lending also minimizes the transaction costs incurred by participants, especially 
when compared to direct formal lending to a large number of borrowers of small 
amounts. In large part, it does this by providing financial services at transaction points 
that already exist, thus realizing scope economies for both lender and borrower. 
8 
Spreading formal loans to a number of merchants also segments failures. H a 
small number of merchants are ineffective in successfully screening for creditworthy 
borrowers, their failure need not result in a systemic failure. 
In addition, policy makers and banks may find it easier to enhance the 
creditworthiness of a relatively small number of merchant borrowers than it would be to 
enhance directly the creditworthiness, in the eyes of the formal lender, of thousands of 
small borrowers. Finally, merchant lending may be a way of enticing risk-averse formal 
lenders into more extensive rural lending later. 
Weaknesses 
Enhanced merchant lending will not be a panacea for rural finance problems that 
plague many countries. Some of these problems will only be resolved through the slow 
process of building strong, efficient, and durable formal financial systems. A major 
component of this will be widespread deposit mobilization, a vital financial function that 
is excluded from merchant-lending programs. Financial intermediation must operate on 
two legs: lending and deposit mobilization. Merchant-lending programs should be 
viewed as a stop-gap technique that is only emphasized until efficient formal financial 
intermediation is in place. 
In most countries, merchants and informal lenders are viewed with suspicion. 
Their functions are poorly understood and politicians and demagogues often subject 
them to verbal floggings. In some cases these biases must be addressed and moderated 
before a merchant-lending program can be implemented. 
.. 
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Politicians and donors may also find that merchant-lending schemes will not 
permit effective loan targeting at priority groups and activities. It is also unlikely that 
many of the informal loans handled by merchant lenders will directly reach the poorest-
of-the-poor. __ Many of these individuals are not creditworthy and informal lenders must 
screen out many of these individuals if their lending operatio~ are to persist. Merchant 
lending will likely be most successful where the marketable surplus is largest. 
OVERCOMINGCOI.LA1ERALPROBLEMS 
One of the major stumbling blocks to increasing merchants' access to formal 
loans, especially in Eastern Europe, will likely be the lack of appropriate collateral. One · 
way of easing this problem might be to develop bonded warehouses that provide 
negm:.:b!e receipts which can be used as loan collateral. Several countries have 
experimented with this, the Philippines probably having the best documented experience 
(Bautista). 
Development of bonded warehouses might complement projects that focus on 
providing more formal loans to merchants. These warehouses might allow merchants to 
overcome some collateral hurdles and also enhance their general liquidity. 
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NEXT STEPS 
Further work on merchant-credit projects might involve five steps: 
1. It would be useful to analyze the design, operatio~ and results of a handful 
. of the most successful merchant-credit projects. This may provide 
guidelines and lessons useful in forming new projects. 
2. In several low-income countries where donors or governments are 
interested in developing a merchant-credit project, pre-project studies 
might be done on the structure and performance of existing informal and 
formal credit arrangements that are associated with merchants who operate 
in rural areas. This might include an analysis of their creditworthiness, 
their access to formal loans, and identifying the hurdles that block their 
further access. 
3. Because of the flux in financial markets in Eastern Europe, pre-project 
studies there may not be very useful. Some insights into what might be 
expected to evolve, however, can be gleaned indirectly from studying the 
changes in financial arrangements that occur with privatization of large 
firms in low-income countries. For example, chemical fertilizer markets 
have recently been privatized in countries such as Egypt, Bangladesh, and 
Ghana. A study of the changes in formal and informal finance in several 
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of these cases may be the best predidor available of what to exped in 
Eastern Europe • 
. 
4. . In some cases a merchant-credit projed may also address collateral 
~ttleneclcs that limit the creditworthiness of merchants and thereby reduce 
their access to formal loans. A careful study of bonded warehouses in 
several countries may show the extent to which they might be a useful 
element in merchant-credit projedS. 
5. The final step would be to design several projedS that focused on 
expanding formal loans to merchants who also provide informal loans in 
rural areas. 'Ibis might include designing parallel studies to document the 
extent to which the projed enhances the creditworthiness of participating 
merchants, and also the extent to which merchants provide additional 
informal loans to their clients. These results could then be used in making 
decisions about developing additional merchant-credit projedS. 
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